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AN ESSAY  FOR FRANK MICHELMAN
Martha Minow*
One of the  many reasons  why  there is no legal scholar I  admire more than
Frank  Michelman  lies  in his own personal commitment to learning.  Frank  learns
all  the time.  He teaches  himself new  things; he  stretches and  challenges  his  old
ideas.  He tries new ones.  Receptive  to new theoretical developments, he has not
only  welcomed  Rawlsian  theories  of  justice,  critical  legal  studies,  feminism,
republicanism,  critical  race  theory,  law  and  economics,  and  Habermasian
conceptions  of  liberalism,  but he  has  also  notoriously  improved  other  people's
theories in both his sympathetic and critical retellings.
In  the  context  of evaluating  whether  economic  analysis  offers  a  basis  for
preferring  private  property  arrangements,  Frank  concluded  one  article  with  a
statement  that  exemplifies  what  makes  his  work  so  commendable.  He  wrote:
"With that provisional view, you might want to keep on investigating, rather than
considering  the  matter  closed."'  There  could  be  no  better  exemplar  of  the
commitment to learning and thinking, and to education of self and others.
Of  course,  Frank's  commitment  to  education  takes  more  concrete
expressions.  His  career  as  an  invigorating  and  inspiring  classroom  teacher  is
matched  only  by  his  unparalleled  gifts  as  a  mentor  and  interlocutor  for  law
students,  graduate  students,  and colleagues.  With  our offices  close  by,  I  get  to
eavesdrop  occasionally  on  the animated  one-on-one  sessions  Frank  holds  as  he
discusses  canonical  texts,  new  drafts,  and  unwritten  ideas  with  students  and
colleagues.
Further, Frank has repeatedly brought his laser-sharp focus on the case for a
right  to education,  the  focus  of  my essay.  Education  figures prominently  in his
bold  1969  argument  that  the  Fourteenth  Amendment's  commitment  to  equal
protection  of  the  laws  involves  a  duty  to  protect  the  poor. 2   There  he
demonstrated  that  the  distinction  between  the  evils  of  relative  and  absolute
*  William Henry Bloomberg  Professor  of Law, Harvard  Law School.  Thanks  to Katie  Wiik  for
very helpful research assistance and comments.
1.  Frank  I. Michelman,  Ethics, Economics, and the  Law of Property, in NOMOS XXIV:  Ethics,
Economics, and the Law  3,  34  (J.  Roland Pennock  &  John  W.  Chapman  eds.,  N.Y.U.  Press  1982)
(reprinted in 39 Tulsa L. Rev. 663 (2004)).
2.  See Frank  I. Michelman, Foreword:  On Protecting  the Poor through the Fourteenth  Amendment,
83 Harv. L. Rev. 7 (1969).
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deprivation  has  no bearing  on the  question  of objective  inequality.3  Indeed,  he
showed eerie  prescience  in considering  the deprivations that would  be worked by
users'  fees in schools,4  as many jurisdictions now struggle with whether to prevent
families  from supplementing  school  vouchers.  Frank evidenced similar  foresight
in highlighting the role the state action doctrine plays in insulating inequality from
challenge,5  for  currently  members  of  wealthy  communities  create  private
foundations  to fund  their  own local  public  school  without benefiting  schools  in
other neighborhoods.
Frank  argued  in  1979  that  basic  education  and  "the  literacy,  fluency,  and
elementary  understanding of politics  and markets that are hard to obtain without
it...  [are]  universal,  rock-bottom  prerequisites  of  effective  participation  in
Democratic  representation  ....  , 6  In  1988,  he offered  a bracing  interpretation of
Brown v.  Board of Education7 that  in many  ways  prefigures later  Michelmanian
conceptions of the relationships among law, democracy, and politics:
If we imagine  the Brown Court acting  in  accordance  with the understanding..,  of
constitutional  adjudication as always proceeding  from within  an on-going normative
dialogic practice,  then that  Court's willingness to be  [enlisted in the transformative
politics of the civil  rights movement]  must signify its grasp of the enlisters and their
work as lying within the bounds, if away from  the center, of our then constitutional
practice.  Thus  informed, the Brown Court spoke in the accents  of invention, not of
convention;  it  spoke  for  the future,  criticizing  the  past;  it  spoke  for  law, creating
authority;  it engaged in political argument.
8
It  should  be  clear  that we  could  follow  Michelman's  contributions  to  the
jurisprudence  of  education  into  many  fascinating  fields  and  forests.  What
conceptions  of equality and protection and what moral theories best serve a liberal
democracy  proceeding  under  non-ideal  conditions?9  When  and  how  can  social
and  economic  rights be justiciable  and  enforceable  by  courts,  a  matter of great
moment in contemporary  South Africa, if not obviously so in the United States?1 0
What  relationship  should  law have  to politics?  What  could ground  the  right  to
have  rights  or  the  right  to  inclusion  that  itself  would  inform  the  shape  of all
rights?1  What kind  of  social  life  as well  as  political  procedures  are  essential  to
liberal  constitutional  democracy?1
2   How  does  the  state's  treatment  of extra-
3.  Id. at 49.
4.  Id. at 46.
5.  Id. at 55-57.
6.  Frank  I.  Michelman,  Welfare Rights in a Constitutional Democracy, 1979  Wash.  U.  L.Q.  659,
677.  That the  text  put the argument  in  the  form  of rhetorical  questions  manifests  the emphasis  the
author used to articulate it.
7.  347  U.S. 483 (1954)  ("Brown I").
8.  Frank Michelman, Law's Republic,  97  Yale L.J.  1493, 1524 (1988).
9.  See  Frank  I.  Michelman,  The  Constitution, Social Rights, and Liberal Political Justification, 1
Intl. J. Const.  L.  13 (2003);  Frank  I. Michelman,  In Pursuit  of Constitutional  Welfare Rights: One View
of Rawls' Theory of  Justice, 121 U. Pa. L. Rev. 962,  1015-19 (1973).
10.  See generally Michelman, supra n. 8, at 1524.
11.  See Frank I. Michelman, Parsing "A Right to Have Rights," 3 Constellations 200, 205  (1996).
12.  See  Frank  I.  Michelman,  What  (if  Anything)  is  Progressive-Liberal  Democratic
Constitutionalism?,  4 Widener  L. Symp. J. 181,  194-95 (1999).
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governmental  social processes-social  movements and protest actions-affect the
prospects  for  transformative  self-renewal  needed  by  a  liberal  constitutional
democracy  but feared  by state  officials?"  How can  we mediate the  "empire  and
paideia"' ' 4  to promote  and  enlarge  freedom  through  self-government? 5   Frank
himself  has  planted  and  continues  to  harvest  these  fields  more  brilliantly  than
anyone  else  could.  Therefore,  I will  pursue the  jurisprudence  of education  in  a
different, though I hope, compatible, mode.
I  want  to  revisit  the  historic  struggle  to  end  racial  segregation  and
subordination  in  American  schools.  This  period  includes  the  present,  for  the
struggle  is  far  from  over.  Legal  strategies  of  the National  Association  for the
Advancement  of Colored  People  (NAACP),  the  civil  rights  movement,  and  the
chain  of judicial  opinions  stretching  from  the  1930s  through  the  present,  with
special focus on the  1950s and 1960s, are the focus of my article.  The questions  I
want  to  ask are  of historical  explanation  and  contemporary  theory.  How did it
come to pass-and what should it mean for the development of a cogent theory of
rights-that the anti-communism  of the  cold  war era could  be  mobilized  to chill
and  punish  advocates  for  racial  equality  and  social justice,  while  the  same  anti-
communism  could  infuse  governmental  support  for  desegregating  the  military,
schools,  and  political life?  Drawing  from  recent  historical  work,16 I  will  suggest
that the  political  dynamics  of the  1940s and  1950s pushed for disaggregating  the
vision of an equal and free people into separate dimensions: the civil, the political,
the  economic,  and  the  social.  As  Mark  Tushnet  has  argued,  drafters  and
contemporaneous  interpreters  of  the  Reconstruction  Amendments  similarly
categorized  rights  along  these  lines,  but  the  content  within  each  category  has
changed  significantly  over  time. 7  If any  context  invited  an  integration  of civil,
13.  See Michelman, supra n. 8, at 1531-32.
14.  Frank I. Michelman, Foreword: Traces of Self-Government, 100 Harv. L. Rev. 4, 73  (1986).
15.  See id. at 73-74.
16.  Carol Anderson, Eyes Off the Prize: The  United Nations and the African American Struggle for
Human Rights, 1944-1955 (Cambridge  U.  Press 2003);  Taylor Branch,  Parting  the Waters: America in
the King  Years  1954-63 (Touchstone  1988);  Mary  L.  Dudziak,  Cold War  Civil Rights: Race and the
Image of American Democracy (Princeton  U.  Press 2000)  [hereinafter  Dudziak, Cold War]; Mark V.
Tushnet, Making Civil Rights Law: Thurgood Marshall  and the Supreme Court, 1936-1961 (Oxford  U.
Press  1994);  Mary  L. Dudziak,  Desegregation as a Cold War Imperative, 41  Stan.  L.  Rev. 61  (1988)
[hereinafter  Dudziak, Desegregation].
17.  See Mark Tushnet, The Politics of Equality in Constitutional  Law: The Equal Protection Clause,
Dr. Du Bois,  and Charles Hamilton Houston, in  The  Constitution and American  Life  224,  226-27
(David Thelen ed., Cornell U. Press 1988); Mark Tushnet, Civil Rights and Social Rights: The Future  of
the Reconstruction Amendments, 25 Loy. L.A.  L. Rev. 1207,  1209-10 (1992)  [hereinafter Tushnet, The
Future]. Tushnet  argued that "[flor  Reconstruction  legal thinkers civil, political and social  rights were
seen  as  three distinct  categories."  Tushnet,  The  Future, supra n.  17,  at  1208.  He  explains  his  views
about the categories:
Civil  rights  attached  to people  simply because  they were  people;  they  were the  rights one
had  in a state of nature, such  as the right to personal freedom  of action, the right to life and
the  right  to  select  and  pursue  a  life  plan.  The  Privileges  or  Immunities  Clause  of the
Fourteenth Amendment  protected these civil rights.  Political rights,  in contrast, arose  from
a  person's location  in  an  organized  political  system.  These  included  the right  to vote and
otherwise participate  in the political life of the community by, for example, jury service.  The
Fifteenth  Amendment  protected  the  central  political  right  to  vote.  Social  rights  were
exercised  in  the  rest  of  the  social  order  and,  most  importantly,  in  the  market.  For
2004]
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political, economic,  and  social  rights, it would  be  education, where  each  student
should  not  only  be  seen  as  a  child  like  any other  child,  but  also  as  a  potential
voter, juror, employer, taxpayer, and friend or neighbor.
Therefore,  in  the  cases  leading  up  to Brown  v.  Board of Education, the
plaintiffs  and  their  lawyers  tried  to  integrate  these  different  facets  into  their
arguments  for desegregating  the schools. 1 8  As the remedial  process unfolded in a
context of resistance  and conflict, courts  increasingly disaggregated the  rights and
the  vision  was  lost.  The  recent  legal  struggle  under  state  constitutions  for
adequate education offers  a chance  to reassemble  these vital elements, but only if
enriched  and  enlivened  by  the  kind  of  ambitious,  generous,  self-critical,  and
dialogic project of political and social theory and practice  exemplified by the work
of Frank Michelman.
I.  THE PROBLEMATIC
Legal  historians  Mary  Dudziak, Michael  Krenn,  and  Thomas  Borstelmann
have  thoroughly  documented  the  influence  of cold  war  politics  on  the  federal
government's  decision  to  desegregate  the  military  and  advocate  desegregating
schools.'9  Rhetoric  about  American  freedom  and  democracy  increased  during
World War  II.  America's  image and  its claims to  epitomize democracy  received
serious challenges,  however, when  international  media  and foreign governments,
after  the  war,  criticized  Jim  Crow  laws  and  other  racist  policies  in  the  United
States.2°  In the midst of America's  fight against Communism  in the cold war, this
challenge  to  American  claims  genuinely  impaired  U.S.  international  efforts,
especially  in  the developing  world.  Hence,  people  in the  State Department  and
other officials pressed for improving domestic treatment of racial  issues as part of
a foreign policy strategy.21 President Truman pursued pro-civil  rights propaganda
and  speeches.  This  important  feature  of  federal  policy  may  indicate  the
22 limitations  in  the  government's  commitment  to  civil  rights.  The  federal
government's  support  of racial  segregation  reflected  foreign  policy  and  political
Reconstruction  legal thought, government  had  nothing to do with guaranteeing  social rights
except to enforce those rights guaranteed by the common law.
Id. (footnotes  omitted).  Tushnet suggests  a  parallel  between  these categories  and  conceptions
prevailing in  the 1970s and 1980s,  making distinctions among civil,  political, and social rights.  Id.
at  1207.  Yet  the content  signified  by each  term has  changed dramatically-which,  according  to
Tushnet,  demonstrates  the historically  continent nature  of distinctions  between  types of  rights.
Thus, contemporary  legal  culture  "treats the  right to vote and  the right of unimpeded  access  to
public accommodations  as civil rights, not as the political  or social rights [beyond the scope of the
Fourteenth Amendment]  they would have been treated as a century  ago."  Id. (footnote omitted).
18.  See  Richard  Kluger,  Simple Justice: The History of Brown  v.  Board  of Education  and Black
America's Struggle for Equality (Alfred A. Knopf 1976).
19.  See  Thomas  Borstelmann,  The Cold War and the Color Line: American Race  Relations in the
Global Arena (Harv.  U.  Press  2001);  Dudziak,  Cold  War, supra n.  16;  Michael  L.  Krenn,  Black
Diplomacy: African Americans and the  State  Department, 1945-1969 (M.E.  Sharpe  1999);  Dudziak,
Desegregation,  supra  n.  16.
20.  See Dudziak, Cold War, supra n.  16, at 14-17; Dudziak, Desegregation,  supra n.  16, at 80-93.
21.  See Dudziak, Desegregation,  supra n.  16, at 118; Krenn, supra  n.  19, at 28.
22.  Dudziak,  Desegregation,  supra n.  16, at 119.
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party  interests.  This  evidence  offers  some  support  for Derrick  Bell's  argument
that racial  justice  proceeds  only when  the  interests  of blacks  converge  with  the
interests  of  whites.23  Yet  this  narrative  also  raises  a  genuine  puzzle  about  the
operation  of cold  war and anti-communist  ideologies in and  around  the struggles
for  civil rights.  For as  powerful  as these  ideologies  may have been  in mobilizing
white Democratic support for civil rights, they also fueled the McCarthy-era witch
hunts that stymied civil rights efforts  and punished civil rights activists throughout
the 1940s and 1950s.
For example,  when  Anne  Braden,  a  southern  white  woman,  advocated  an
end  to  racial  segregation  as  a  young journalist  in  Alabama  and  Kentucky  in the
1940s, she became  concerned about racism and poverty.  Soon she was branded  a
leftist, a subversive,  and even a Communist, and she encountered the growing gulf
between  liberals  and  left-wingers  following  the  end  of  World  War  II.  Anti-
Communist  rhetoric  escalated  in  response  to  civil  rights  and  labor  organizing
24 efforts after the war ended  . Referring  to someone  as a Communist  was enough
to  silence  many  white  southerners;25  and  known  Communists  faced  social
ostracism, long-term unemployment,  and even serious violence.
Nonetheless,  Braden continued her work with left-leaning  civil rights groups.
She and her husband Carl acted as "fronts"  to buy a house for Andrew Wade  IV,
an  African-American,  in  an  all-white  neighborhood.  A  leading  newspaper
condemned  the  Bradens  as  agitators  who  artificially  forced  the  race  relations
issue, even  though the very same paper, on the same day, endorsed the Supreme
Court's  ruling in  Brown v.  Board of Education. 26  The Wades  were  terrorized  in
their home and ultimately driven out by dynamite.
2
'  The NAACP held the matter
28 at a distance, apparently trying to avoid links with known leftists.
The  Bradens  became  targets  of  an  intimidating  campaign  by  state  and
federal prosecutors.  Called before  a grand jury investigating the  violence,  Anne
Braden was asked about her and her husband's political beliefs and memberships.
Knowing  about  the  work  of the  House  UnAmerican  Activities  Committee,  she
refused  to  answer.  The  prosecutor  and  local  media  drummed  up  hints  of
Communist  solicitation  of violence.  The grand  jury concluded  that the  Bradens
had  tried  to  obstruct justice  because  of their  failure  to  answer  questions  about
21 their political associations.
Before the end of 1954, Carl Braden and an associate were charged  with and
convicted  of sedition.  This experience  actually  propelled  Anne's  continuing and
deepening involvement in  civil rights activism.  From that time to the present,  she
23.  See Derrick A.  Bell, Jr.,  Brown v.  Board  of Education  and the Interest-Convergence Dilemma,
93 Harv. L. Rev. 518 (1980); Dudziak, Desegregation,  supra n. 16, at 119.
24.  See Catherine Fosl, Subversive Southerner: Ann  Braden and the Struggle  for Racial Justice in the
Cold War South 75, 97 (Palgrave MacMillan  2002).
25.  See id. at 97.
26.  Id. at 146.
27.  Id. at 152-53.
28.  Id. at 154.
29.  See Fos], supra n. 24, at 164.
2004]
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has  refused  to respond  to  questions  about  whether  she  is or  was  a  Communist,
even  as  reporters,  politicians,  employers,  students,  and  neighbors  persistently
inquired. °
Braden's  biographer treated the two different effects of cold war ideology on
civil rights advocacy as ironic:
The  dynamics  of  the  Cold  War  thus  gave  government  image-makers  some
impetus  to  achieve  better race relations  insofar  as  to do  otherwise left  the United
States open  to international  criticism  that undercut  its image  as  leader of the  free
world.  But  ironically,  those  same  Cold  War  dynamics  also  tended  to  reinforce
attitudes  about alleged  "subversion"  that had been prominent  in American  culture
since World War 11.31
How  many  individuals  were  deterred  because  they  were  fearful  of
allegations  of  subversion  if  they  supported  civil  rights?  The  problem  was
especially  complicated  because  for  some  time  the  Communist  Party  was  more
explicitly and  emphatically committed to racial justice than the dominant political
parties  and  even  the  Socialists. 32  That  is why  Bayard  Rustin initially  joined the
Young Communist League.  He left in  1941, however, when the Nazis invaded the
Soviet  Union,  and  he  assiduously  sought  to  separate  himself  from  Communist
organizations thereafter.3 3  Nonetheless, that association 34 followed Rustin and fed
opposition when  Rustin traveled  to  advise Dr. Martin Luther  King, Jr., and later
organized the  March on Washington.35  The FBI justified its monitoring of Rustin
and King on grounds of Communist associations.36
Perhaps  we  could  understand  the  conjunction  of  cold  war  and  anti-
Communist policies as efforts to placate southern Democrats.  President Truman's
administration  could  appeal  to their anti-Communism  by indicating  the need  for
some concessions on race relations  while holding the line against rights to housing
or health care that smacked of Soviet subversion of democracy and free markets. 37
Even  Eleanor  Roosevelt,  ostensibly  a  great  friend  to the  civil  rights  movement,
performed  this  political  dance  in  her  role  as  chair  of  the  UN  Commission  on
Human Rights.  In the early 1950s, with full awareness of the potential links to Jim
Crow  in  the  United  States,  she  joined  southern  leaders  in  trying  to  halt  a
complaint to the  UN  arising from South Africa's systematic  race discrimination.3 8
She  also  supported  the  inclusion  of a  clause  in  the  Covenant  on Human  Rights
that  would  insulate states  within  a  federal  system  from  interference  though  she
30.  See id. at 212-68, 307-31,  334.
31.  Id. at 289.
32.  Jervis Anderson, Bayard Rustin: Troubles I've Seen: A Biography  55  (U. Cal.  Press 1998).
33.  Id. at 56, 205.
34.  Rustin, who was sexually involved with men, also was dogged by rumors and negative  reactions
to his  sexuality.  See John D'Emilio, Homophobia and the Trajectory of Postwar  American Radicalism:
The Career  of Bayard Rustin, 62 Radical Hist. Rev. 80  (1995).
35.  Anderson, supra n. 32, at 210, 247, 267.
36.  Id. at  202-04,  267.  J.  Edgar  Hoover  apparently  pursued  restraints  on  King  even  without
evidence at the height of national fear of Soviet aggression.  Branch, supra n.  16, at 678-79.
37.  See Anderson, supra n. 16, at 5.
38.  See id.
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knew  this  would  leave  unchallenged  the  lynching  and  racialized  justice  of  the
American  South.
39  Indeed,  her statement  on the  subject  included  an  assurance
that the federal government  would not insist on a "right to education,
40  because of
the clause  protecting states within a federal system.  It is hard  not to conclude, as
historian  Carol  Anderson  has  stated recently,  that Roosevelt  "saw  to it that  the
human rights documents emerging from her committee would position the United
States  as the moral leader of the free world, while the United States continued its
amoral treatment of African Americans.,
4 1
Pressured to demonstrate  its anti-communism,  and facing vigilant review by
the FBI, the NAACP undertook an internal witch hunt and purged not only actual
but also suspected Communists.42  Some found the NAACP more concerned  with
its  anti-Communism  than  civil  rights. 43  When  the  federal  government  indicted
(but unsuccessfully prosecuted) W.E.B. Du Bois for failing to register  as a foreign
agent while participating in the creation of the Peace Information  Center-a New
York  effort  to  distribute  information  about  world  peace  conventions-the
NAACP leadership  distanced  itself from  Du Bois,  the organization's  co-founder.
Motivated  in part by a personal  rivalry with Du Bois,  Walter White warned  that
the patriotism of the NAACP would come under question  if it supported Du Bois
and his allegedly Communist-inspired  propaganda. 4 4
One  organization  that  had  deep  Communist  ties,  the  National  Negro
Congress, 45 developed  the idea of petitioning the United Nations over the human
rights violations embedded  in the treatment  of African-Americans  in the United
States.  Yet,  its  Communist  affiliations  contributed  to  the  demise  of  the
organization-even  as  Communist  Party  leaders  blamed  the  lack  of their  direct
involvement in the organization for its failure.46  NAACP leaders debated whether
to  adopt  the  idea  and  concluded  that  it would  have  a  better  chance  of  success
because  of its vigilance  against  Communist  infiltration  inside the  organization.47
Yet, to many  in the United States, the United Nations itself seemed a Communist
organization that challenged American  sovereignty  with internationalist plans for
political,  civil,  and  economic  rights  that  the  Soviets  would  dictate.4 8  Even  the
convention  condemning  genocide  seemed  a  Communist plot.49  Continuing  well
39.  Id. at 4.  Roosevelt regretted  that sometimes she had to "disappoint old friends" at the National
Association  for  the  Advancement  of  Colored  People  but  nonetheless  understood  her  role  as  a
representative of the U.S. government  to halt taking sides  on issues that divided the country.  See Mary
Ann Glendon, A  World Made New: Eleanor Roosevelt and the Universal  Declaration  of Human Rights
82 (Random House  2001).  Roosevelt  also publicly  acknowledged  racial discrimination  and lynchings
but condemned  them as both against the law and  unacceptable.  See id. at 150, 202.
40.  See Anderson, supra n.  16, at 4.
41.  Id. at 133.
42.  Id. at 167.
43.  Id.
44.  Id. at 173.
45.  Anderson, supra n.  16 at 20.
46.  See id. at 90-91.
47.  Id. at 93.
48.  See id. at 217.
49.  Id.
20041
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into  the  1980s,  advocates  of the  U.S.  endorsement  of the Genocide  Convention
had  to contend  with  charges  of Communism.  Yet these  same  advocates  would
reply that nonratification hurt U.S. cold war diplomacy.5°  Both sides would claim
to be anti-Communist, while in the meantime, such arguments narrowed the space
for any rights in the United States that seemed to involve economic  redistribution
or social equality.51
II.  THE DISAGGREGATION
In addition to the domestic and geopolitical  considerations, anti-Communist
and  cold war conceptions  contributed  to  and  reflected  the ongoing  debate  over
which rights  could and  should  be pursued  in  search  of racial justice  in America.
That  debate  cannot  be  separated  from  the  struggle  for  racial  equality.  White
abolitionists  maintained  reservations  over  social  equality  and  integration. 52
Northern  Republicans  in  1966  specifically  resisted  articulations  of  social  rights,
such as interracial marriage and school integration, in addition to opposing voting
and jury service.53
The  Supreme  Court erected  an  explicit  distinction  between  political  rights
and  social  rights  in  Plessy  v.  Ferguson. 54  In  Plessy, Justice  Brown  sought  to
distinguish  the  civil  right  to  serve  on  a  jury  announced  in  Strauder v.  West
Virginia 5 5 from the equality involved in the sharing of railroad cars.  Justice Brown
reasoned  that  the  Fourteenth  Amendment  "could  not  have  been  intended  to
abolish distinctions  based upon  color, or to  enforce  social, as  distinguished  from
political  equality, or a commingling of the two races  upon terms unsatisfactory  to
either.,
56
Organized  to  combat  precisely  that  legacy,  the  NAACP  nonetheless
struggled over whether its mandate included economic  as well as political and civil
rights.  In  1939,  black  political  scientist  Ralph  Bunche  criticized  the  NAACP's
emphasis on civil  rights and neglect of economic rights.5 7  This triggered a debate
within the organization  that to no small degree continues  to this day.5 8
Informed  in  part  by  global  articulations  of rights  in  the  context  of both
international  and  emerging  nationalist  initiatives,  African-American  leaders
ranging from William  Hastie to W.E.B. Du Bois looked to emerging  conceptions
50.  Samantha Power, "A Problem From Hell": America and the Age of Genocide 157-58 (Basic Bks.
2002).
51.  See Anderson, supra  n.  16, at 222.
52.  See Benjamin Quarles, Black Abolitionists  47-50 (Oxford U. Press 1969).
53.  Michael  J.  Klarman,  The  Plessy Era, in  1998: The  Supreme Court Review  303,  325  (Dennis J.
Hutchinson, David A. Strauss & Geoffrey R. Stone eds., U. Chi. Press 1999).
54.  163 U.S. 537 (1896); see Nan D. Hunter, Escaping  the Expression-Equality Conundrum: Toward
Anti-Orthodoxy and Inclusion,  61 Ohio St. L.J. 1671,  1697 (2000).
55.  100 U.S.  303  (1879)  (overturning a state murder conviction of a black man given a state statute
preventing blacks from  serving on juries).
56.  Plessy, 163  U.S. at 544.
57.  Anderson, supra n. 16, at 18.
58.  See e.g. Bell, supra n.  23, at 524-28.
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of human rights to frame the vision of justice in the United States. 9  Thus, in 1944,
Hastie argued,  "We  cannot hope  to raise the  literacy  of other nations  and  fail  to
roll back the ignorance  that clouds many communities in many sectors of our own
nation..,  all people  [must]  have the opportunity for  the fullest education." 60  At
the  same  time,  the  National  Negro  Congress  and  the  NAACP  petitioned  the
United  Nations  with  arguments  that  the  United  States  deprived  African-
Americans  of  rights  enjoyed  by  other  citizens  through  lynching,
disenfranchisement,  and  staggering poverty.61  Should social  and economic rights
belong  within  basic  international  documents  such  as  the  Declaration  and
Covenants  on  Human  Rights?  Should  U.N.  bodies  like  the  Human  Rights
Commission  have authority  over such issues?  These issues produced contentious
debates  in  an  international  context,  expressing  national  and  ideological
62 differences,  even  as it continued  to divide  people within  the  United States  and
within the NAACP.63
Comparisons of national constitutions indicate that the focus on political and
civil  rights  in  the  United  States  contrasts  with  commitments  to  social  and
economic rights in other national settings.64  Those social and economic rights may
be  defined  and  limited  by  statute  or  otherwise  negotiated  through  political
processes  -a  subject  Frank  Michelman  has  richly explored  both in  the United
States and South  African contexts.6 6  William  Forbath has examined  in depth the
strand of social  and  economic rights within American  law and politics. 6 7  Central
roots  lie in anti-slavery  and  Reconstruction  theories  and politics.  Progressive-era
reformers  advanced  respect  for  wage  earners  that  would  undergird  social  and
economic  protections.  President  Franklin  Roosevelt's  conception  of  the  four
freedoms and  elements of the New Deal advanced  a conception  of the social  and
economic predicates  for citizenship.  The War on Poverty  revived some  of these
ideas.  Labor  movements  during  the  last  two centuries  also  revived  these  ideas
while  articulating  a  conception  of  work  as  the  foundational  basis  for  equal
59.  See Anderson, supra n.  16, at 26, 33.
60.  Id. at 26 (quoting untitled document by William H. Hastie) (internal quotations omitted).
61.  Id. at 80-82.
62.  See  Mary  Ann  Glendon,  Propter Honoris Respectum: Knowing the  Universal Declaration of
Human Rights, 73 Notre  Dame  L. Rev.  1153,  1153-54  (1998);  Amy  C. Harfeld,  Student  Author, Oh
Righteous  Delinquent  One:  The  United  States'  International Human  Rights  Double Standard-
Explanation, Example, and Avenues for Change, 4 N.Y.C. L. Rev. 59,76-77  (2001).
63.  See Anderson, supra n.  16, at 134-37,  142-52.
64.  See  W. Kent Davis, Answering Justice Ginsburg's Charge That the Constitution is  "Skimpy"  in
Comparison to Our International  Neighbors: A  Comparison of Fundamental Rights in American and
Foreign Law, 39  S. Tex. L. Rev. 951,  966, 970 (1998);  Mary Ann Glendon, Rights in Twentieth-Century
Constitutions,  59 U. Chi. L. Rev. 519, 521  (1992); Berta Esperanza Hernandez-Truyol  & Shelbi D. Day,
Property, Wealth, Inequality and Human Rights: A  Formula  for Reform, 34 Ind.  L. Rev. 1213  (2001).
65.  See Glendon, supra n. 64, at 524-25.
66.  See e.g. Michelman, supra n. 6.
67.  See  e.g.  William  E.  Forbath,  Constitutional  Welfare  Rights:  A  History,  Critique  and
Reconstruction, 69 Fordham  L. Rev.  1821  (2001);  William  E. Forbath,  The  New  Deal Constitution in
Exile, 51 Duke L.J. 165  (2001)  [hereinafter Forbath, New Deal Constitution].
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citizenship.68  Academics  have debated the issue both as a matter of constitutional
law  and  as  a matter of legal  and  political  theory. 69  Whether  framed  in  terms of
debates  over negative  versus  positive  rights, justifiability,  or the foundations  for
rights,  academics  have  mirrored  the  political  debate  concerning  whether
governments  should assure  individuals  not only protections  against incursions  on
their liberty and rights to participate in political  processes, but also social equality
and economic  well-being. °  For Michelman,  the  issue  is one  of the  bases of self-
respect and mutual respect."
With self-respect, mutual respect, and respect  over time very  much at stake,
perhaps no issue so joins political  and civil  rights with social and  economic  rights
so  clearly  as  does  education.  The  struggle  for  school  desegregation,  from  its
inception,  implicated  access  to  effective  political  participation,  membership  in
dominant  civil  institutions,  social  integration,  redressing  existing  economic
disparities,  reallocating  economic  resources,  and  opening  up  economic
opportunities.  Brown  v.  Board of Education and  many  subsequent  cases  also
explicitly  challenged  the  idea  that  segregated  institutions  could  ever  be
economically,  politically, or socially equal.  Yet, the saga  of school  desegregation
has  not  been  a  happy  one.  Public  schools  in  America  remain  dramatically
segregated  by  race,  with  patterns  of  growing  resegregation,  although  the
immediate  cause  now  is  housing  segregation  rather  than  racialized  school
assignments.72  Reluctance  to enforce their own decision  led the Supreme  Court to
direct a remedy with  "all deliberate speed, 73  a directive that surely contributed to
the  total inaction  in  most of  the  South  for  the  first  ten  years  following  Brown.
Next  came  the  period  of  serious  judicial  supervision,  along  with  serious  and
sometimes violent  local  opposition.  It was  not long,  however,  before the courts
68.  See  Forbath,  New  Deal Constitution, supra n.  67,  at  184-85;  For  an  argument  that  work-
meaning an opportunity "for work to earn a living wage for all who need and demand it"-is central to
citizenship,  see  Judith  N.  Shklar, American Citizenship: The  Quest for Inclusion 99  (Harv.  U.  Press
1991).
69.  See e.g. Robert  H. Bork,  The Impossibility of Finding Welfare Rights in  the Constitution, 1979
Wash.  U. L.Q.  695.
70.  See Hannah Arendt, Reflections on Little Rock, 6 Dissent 45  (1959); Susan Bandes,  The Negative
Constitution:  A  Critique,  88  Mich. L. Rev. 2271  (1990); Frank  B.  Cross, The Error of Positive Rights, 48
UCLA  L.  Rev.  857  (2001);  Marie  A.  Failinger,  Equality Versus the Right to  Choose Associates: A
Critique of Hannah Arendt's View of the Supreme  Court's Dilemma, 49  U.  Pitt.  L. Rev.  143  (1987);
William  E. Forbath,  Why Is This Rights Talk Different  from All Other Rights Talk? Demoting the Court
and Reimagining the Constitution, 46 Stan.  L. Rev.  1771  (1994);  Helen Hershkoff, Positive Rights and
State  Constitutions: The  Limits of Federal Rationality Review,  112  Harv.  L.  Rev.  1131  (1999);  Cass
Sunstein, Against Positive Rights, 2 E. European Constl. Rev. 35  (Winter 1993).
71.  See Michelman, supra n. 6, at 680-81.
72.  See Erica Frankenberg et  al., A  Multiracial  Society with Segregated Schools: Are We  Losing the
Dream? <http://www.civilrightsproject.harvard.edu/research/reseg03/finalexec.pdf>  (Jan.  2003);  Gary
Orfield,  Schools  More  Separate:  Consequences  of  a  Decade  of  Resegregation  <http://www.
civilrightsproject.harvard.edu/research/deseg/Schools-More-Separate.pdf>  (July 2001).  For thoughtful
arguments  favoring  policies  that  would  promote  racial  and  economic  integration  in  housing  and
schooling, see Owen Fiss, A  Way  Out: America's Ghettos and the Legacy of Racism (Joshua Cohen et
al.  eds.,  Princeton U.  Press  2003);  Richard Thompson  Ford,  Brown's Ghost, 117  Harv.  L. Rev.  1305
(2004);  Molly  S.  McUsic,  The Future of Brown v.  Board  of  Education:  Economic Integration of the
Public Schools, 117 Harv. L. Rev. 1334 (2004).
73.  Brown v. Bd. Educ. of Topeka, 349 U.S. 294, 301 (1955)  ("Brown II").
[Vol. 39:547
10
Tulsa Law Review, Vol. 39 [2003], Iss. 3, Art. 4
http://digitalcommons.law.utulsa.edu/tlr/vol39/iss3/4JUST EDUCATION
began  to disaggregate  social  integration from other features  of the desegregation
effort.  "White  flight"  and the  Court's  decision  to reject an  interdistrict  remedy
assisted  this development.  In 1974, the Court in Milliken v. Bradley 74 excluded  the
Detroit suburbs from the effort to desegregate  the Detroit schools on the grounds
that the surrounding  districts had  not used law to produce their racial  segregation
and thus should  not be  liable for  remedial action.  Yet the Court  later approved
the district  court's call for training  programs and  state aid to the Detroit  schools;
money and  in-kind services  but not suburban  white children could be part of the
remedy.75  In a  way,  economic  rights,  at  least  in  terms  of expenditures,  became
more  palatable  in  the  school  context  than  social  rights  in  the  sense  of  racial
integration.
Yet all  of this  occurred  against the backdrop  of the  Supreme  Court's 1973
refusal  to  recognize  wealth  discrimination  as  an  invidious  discrimination  in
violation  of  the  Equal  Protection  Clause.
76   Disparities  in  resources-and  in
educational  performance-continue  to characterize  impoverished  urban  districts
and indeed, entire state systems.  What precisely can the Constitution, a document
envisioning  equal  protection  and  democratic  self-governance,  ensure  when  it
comes  to education  of children  in a  nation riddled  with the  legacies  of racial  and
class  hierarchies?  Given  the  difficulties  with  federal  court  decisions,  advocates
and scholars  increasingly ask this question outside the context of the United States
Constitution.  Litigators turn to state constitutions and press to close  the per-pupil
disparities  in  expenditures,  or  promote  equal  yield  for  districts  willing  to  tax
themselves to fund schools at an equal rate even if the tax bases are disparate.77
The  focus  on  economic  rights  in  the  school  context  had  its  own
disappointments,  however.  Chief  among  them  were  the  continuing  and  gross
disparities  in student  performance,  with  high  racial  and  class  correlations.  The
newest  wave  of practical  initiatives  toward a  right to  an education  engaged  state
courts  construing  state  constitutions  in  dialogue  with  legislative  action.  For the
past fifteen years, the  watchword  has been adequacy:  what does it take to ensure
an  adequate  education  for all  students?78  Reviewing  the history  of struggles  to
define  and implement a right to adequate education invites reconsideration  of the
divisions among political, civil, social, and economic rights.
74.  418 U.S. 717, 752-53 (1974)  ("Milliken I").
75.  Milliken v. Bradley, 433 U.S. 267, 273-75,291 (1977)  ("Milliken Ir').
76.  See San Antonio Indep. Sch. Dist. v.  Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1, 54-55 (1973).
77.  E.g. Serrano v.  Priest,  557 P.2d 929  (Cal.  1976);  Horton v. Meskill, 376  A.2d 359  (Conn. 1977);
Rose v.  Council  for Better Educ., 790 S.W.2d 186 (Ky. 1989); Abbot v. Burke, 575 A.2d 359 (N.J.  1990);
Seattle Sch.  Dist. No.  I  v.  St.,  585  P.2d  71  (Wash. 1978).  A thoughtful  recent  treatment  of the issues
that raised  challenges to school finance  in New  York State appears in  Brian J. Nickerson  and Gerard
M. Deenihan, From Equity to Adequacy: The Legal Battle for Increased  State Funding of Poor School
Districts in New York, 30 Fordham Urb. L.J.  1341  (2003).
78.  See Rose, 790 S.W.2d  at 215-16.
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III.  THE STRUGGLE FOR ADEQUACY
Law  reformers,  parents,  and  advocates  have  pressed  for  equality  in
allocation of school resources both as part of the struggle for racial equality and as
part of a related effort to ensure every child, regardless  of socio-economic class or
neighborhood  of  residence,  an  equal  educational  chance.79   After  the  United
States Supreme  Court found  no violation of the  federal Equal  Protection  Clause
by  a  Texas  school  finance  system  that  produced  substantial  inter-district
disparities  in  per-pupil  expenditures,8°  such  challenges  proceeded  in  state  courts
under  state  constitutional  equal  protection  clauses  and  state  constitutional
commitments to provide  a "thorough,"  "efficient,"  or "adequate" education. 81
Early state  suits pursuing equal  educational opportunity  emphasized  equity
in  terms  of  the disparity  in  the  amount  of  funds  spent  on  each  student.82  For
example,  at  the  time  of  the  1983  litigation  in  Arkansas,  per-pupil  expenditures
ranged from $2,378 to $873.83  More recently, plaintiffs pointed  to the disparities in
per-pupil expenditures in New York, ranging from $43,000 to $7,107.
84  These suits
challenged  the  reliance  on  local  real  estate  taxes  that  contributed  to  striking
disparities within a state.
Some of these suits pressed for equalization of education  revenues,  a remedy
facing  at least three profound difficulties.  First, courts may  be equipped to reject
taxation  schemes,  but  they  are  not  well  suited  institutionally  or  politically  to
design and implement new ones.  Second, the actual principle  appropriate to guide
school  finance  is not  legally or normatively  obvious.  Should  the  expenditure  on
each child be exactly the same even if it costs more to educate  a child with special
needs,  an  impoverished  background,  or limited  English  proficiency  than  a  child
without these circumstances?  Should the focus of equitable concerns land not on
79.  By 2002, forty-three  suits challenging state school finance regimes  generated nineteen decisions
striking  down  state  schemes  under  the  relevant  state  constitution.  Liz  Kramer,  Student  Author,
Achieving Equitable  Education  through the Courts: A  Comparative Analysis of Three States,  31  J.L. &
Educ. 1, 6 (2002);  see Stewart G. Pollock, J., N.J. S.  Ct., Keynote Address, School Finance in the Courts
(N.Y.U. Sch.  L.,  Oct. 30, 1998),  in  1998 Annual Survey  Am. L. 133,  134 (summarizing  developments).
For  a helpful  overview  of  recent  suits,  see  Molly  S.  McUsic,  The  Law's  Role in  the  Distribution  of
Education:  The  Promises  and  Pitfalls of School Finance Litigation, in  Law  and  School Reform:  Six
Strategies for Promoting Educational Equity 88, 102-19 (Jay B. Heubert  ed., Yale U. Press 1999).
80.  See Rodriguez, 411 U.S.  at 54-55.
81.  See generally Patricia  F. First &  Barbara  M.  De Luca,  The Meaning  of Educational Adequacy:
The  Confusion  of DeRolph, 32 J.L.  & Educ.  185,  191-96  (2003)  (discussing  Ohio  litigation);  Michael
Paris,  Legal  Mobilization  and  the  Politics  of Reform:  Lessons from  School  Finance  Litigation  in
Kentucky,  1984-1995,  26  L. &  Soc. Inquiry  631  (2001); James  E. Ryan,  Sheff, Segregation,  and School
Finance  Litigation,  74  N.Y.U.  L.  Rev.  529,  530,  536-46  (1999)  (discussing  Connecticut  litigation);
William  E.  Thro,  Judicial  Analysis  during  the  Third  Wave  of  School  Finance  Litigation:  The
Massachusetts Decision as a Model, 35 B.C. L. Rev. 597, 601-04 (1994).
82.  See Anna  Williams Shavers, Rethinking the Equity vs. Adequacy Debate: Implications for Rural
School Finance Reform Litigation, 82 Neb. L. Rev.  133,  140-45  (2003).
83.  DuPree v. Alma Sch. Dist., 651  S.W.2d 90, 92 (Ark.  1983).
84.  Jennifer  M. Palmer,  Student Author,  Education  Funding: Equality  Versus Quality-Must New
York's  Children Choose?,  58 Alb. L. Rev. 917, 946  (1995).  The  New York  Court of Appeals indicated
that gross and glaring inadequacies-rather than disparities-could  give  rise to a violation of the state
constitution's  education  clause.  Reform  Educ. Financing Inequities Today v. Cuomo,  655  N.E.2d 647,
648  (N.Y.  1995).
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individual  students  but  instead  on  taxpayers,  such  that  taxpayers  willing  to
undertake  a  given level of effort should  face  lower expenditures  in their  schools
than others who tax themselves  at the same  or lower rate  simply as  a reflection  of
variations  in  local property  values?  Should  equity  in  school  finance  demand  a
uniform per-pupil  expenditure  or simply  a minimal  floor beyond which  localities
may  choose  to  spend  more?  Third,  statewide  school  finance  reform  faces  a
considerable  obstacle  in the traditional commitment  to local  control in  education.
That traditional commitment  reflects conceptions  of the proper location  of power
and also intense  political desires,  especially manifested by many middle-class  and
wealthy parents, to  be able to  choose  their communities,  their schools,  and their
level  of  investment  in  educating  their  own  children.  Unhappy  parents  with
resources  can  move  out  of  state,  opt  for  private  schooling,  or undermine  the
legitimacy  of  a  judicially-sponsored  remedy,  especially  one  that  depends  on  a
cooperative  legislature.  Legislative  efforts  to redress  inequities  have been  slow,
complex, and  in many  instances inadequate  as assessed  both by  reviewing  courts
81 and academic measures of success.
Given  these difficulties,  it is not surprising  that until  1989 most state courts
rejected  challenges to school finance  schemes."  Some legislative reform triggered
by  suits-successful  or  unsuccessful-did  emerge.  As  a  result,  some  states
created  formulas to combine  local district  funds with funds from the general state
tax revenues  allocated  in  a flat grant.  Others devised  policies  to generate  either
the  same per-pupil  expenditures  or expenditures  up to  a  minimum  level for any
district  unable  to  raise  that  amount  of money  even  when  that  district  adopts  a
specified  and  hefty local  tax rate.  Economic  studies  of court-mandated  reforms
found  that in  all but  one  state, California,  successful  litigation prompted  greater
overall  expenditures  for schooling and  the reduction  of inter-district  disparities.87
Nonetheless,  the  suits  based  on  equity  theories  continue  to  face  serious
theoretical, practical, and political difficulties.
Starting  in  1989,  school  finance  litigation  added  to equity  claims  or shifted
entirely to a focus on the adequacy of the educational  program.  This change was
prompted  in part  by  disappointment  with  the  prior  equity  suits  and  in  part by
emerging  national  studies  indicating  overall  underinvestment  in education  that
would  not  be  remedied  simply  by  equalization  efforts. 88   Perhaps  more
importantly, the shift to equity reflected the desire of lawyers  and judges to tether
85.  See McUsic, supra n.  79,  at 90.  The  Texas Supreme  Court  has  repeatedly rejected versions  of
legislative  reform  as falling  short  of  the state constitutional  requirements.  See  Kramer, supra n.  79.
Debate over  the method  for  financing schools  in Texas  continues in the legislature.  See Phil Magers,
Analysis: Texas Grapples with Schools, United Press Intl. (Mar. 11,  2004)  (available  in LEXIS, News &
Bus. library, News  file).
86.  Kramer, supra n. 79,  at 7 (noting that nine of sixteen state courts upheld finance schemes before
1989).
87.  See  id. (citing  Sheila  E.  Murray  et  al.,  Education-Finance Reform  and the  Distribution of
Education Resources, 88 Am. Econ. Rev. 789, 801 (1988)).
88.  See  generally Natl.  Commn.  on  Excellence  in  Educ.,  A  Nation at  Risk:  The  Imperative for
Educational Reform  (1983)  (available  at  <http://www.ed.gov/pubs/NatAtRisk/index.html>);  Richard
Rothstein,  What Does Education Cost?, 185 Am. Sch. Bd. J. 30,  30-33 (Sept.  1998) (explaining the turn
to adequacy  rather than equity theories because  "an equal  amount of too little is not enough").
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reforms  to  educational  expertise.  Improving  schools  requires  knowledge  that
lawyers and judges do not have, and dispersing  money is only  a small part  of the
effort.  Educational  expertise  began  to  appear  in  visible  form  through  the
emergence  of  state  educational  standards,  usually  accompanied  by  statewide
performance  tests.  These  standards  offered  at  least  an  initial  set  of reference
points  about  the  actual  effects  of  the  education  provided  to  students  across  a
state-effects that could be used not only to measure the past but to prod changes
in the future.89  The standards  emerged from efforts to promote  accountability  of
teachers,  as well as students, and to treat tests as diagnostic tools to identify areas
for  improving  instruction.9°   In  addition,  several  distinctive  school  reform
initiatives  addressing  instruction,  governance,  and  parental  involvement  gained
national  attention  during  the  1980s.9'  When  the  Kentucky  Supreme  Court
responded to a  challenge  to the  school finance  system by  finding that the  entire
state school  system failed to offer adequate  education  to its  students, the task  of
devising an acceptable  system was left  to the  state  legislature.  The legislature  in
turn  not  only  raised  per-pupil  spending  by  raising  taxes,  but  also  devised
performance-based  school  reforms  to  reshape  the  curriculum,  governance,  and
accountability systems.  The Kentucky experience exemplified an adequacy theory
in  its  emphasis  on  student-level  results  in  performance,  whole  school  system
reform,  combination  of  changes  in  finance  with  changes  in  instruction  and
accountability,  and  cooperation  between  the  judiciary  and  the  legislature  in
producing  compliance  with  the  state  constitution's  commitment  to  provide
students with an education.9 2
Rather  than  concentrating  on  per-pupil  expenditures,  educational  inputs,
and  reducing  disparities  between  districts,  suits  have  shifted  to  adequacy
arguments in order to pursue institutional  and programmatic changes intended  to
improve  the  academic  performance  of  disadvantaged  students.  The  adequacy
theory, with  some variations, has influenced  court decisions  in not only Kentucky,
but also Alabama,  Connecticut, Massachusetts,  New Hampshire, New Jersey, New
89.  See  Avidan  Y.  Cover,  Student  Author,  Is  "Adequacy"  a  More  "Political Question"  than
"Equality?": The Effect of Standards-Based  Education on Judicial  Standards  for Education Finance,  11
Cornell J.L. & Pub. Policy 403, 404-06, 427-39 (2002).
90.  See Diane Massell,  State Strategies  for Building Capacity in Education: Progress  and Continuing
Challenges  (CPRE  Research  Rpt.  Ser.  No.  RR-41  1998)  (available  at  <http://www.cpre.org/
Publications/rr4l.pdf>);  see generally High  Stakes: Testing for Tracking, Promotion, and Graduation
(Jay P. Heubert & Robert M. Hauser eds., Nati. Acad.  Press 1999)  (assessing high-stakes tests used to
determine who should progress to the next grade or graduate).
91.  See generally e.g. Effective  Programs  for Students at Risk (Robert E. Slavin et  al. eds.,  Allyn &
Bacon  1989)  (describing  Success  for All);  Henry  M.  Levin, Accelerated Schools for At-Risk  Students
(CPRE Research  Rpt. Ser.  No.  RR-010  1988); Theodore R.  Sizer, Horace's School: Redesigning the
American High School (Houghton Mifflin  1992); James  P. Comer, Educating Poor Minority Children,
259  Sci.  Am.  42  (Nov.  1988).  For  efforts  to assess  or  consider  assessment  of such  programs,  see
Thomas D.  Cook,  Resistance to Experiments: Why  Have  Educational Evaluators Chosen Not to Do
Randomized Experiments, 589  Annals  of  Am. Acad.  Pol.  &  Soc.  Sci.  114  (2003);  Jennifer  A. King,
Meeting the Educational  Needs of At-Risk Students: A  Cost Analysis of Three Models, 16 Educ. Eval. &
Policy Analysis 1 (1994).
92.  See Rose, 790 S.W.2d at 215; Paris, supra n.  81, at 632-34.
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York, Washington, and West Virginia.9 3  By emphasizing  the educational  needs of
children  and  calling  for  a  remedy  that  involves  the  legislature  in  devising  a
solution, these  decisions  produced  new  financial investment  in  schools  as part  of
the  larger  commitment  to  each  child.94  By  connecting  explicit  consideration  of
school  finance  and  resources  to  educational  standards  and  actual  student
performance,  parents  and  advocates  have  initiated  a  broad  struggle  for
educational  adequacy  in courts  and  legislatures.  That struggle  integrates  social,
economic,  and  political  dimensions  of education  after  decades  in  which  law and
politics  forced  these  dimensions  to  be  separated  or  truncated.  The jury  is  out
regarding  the  effectiveness  of  the  adequacy  approach;  the  state  legislative
remedies  in  many  instances  look  less  ambitious  than  the  judicial  demands.9 5
Nonetheless, after all these years, the struggle for racial equality has been reunited
with  campaigns for higher quality schools, economic  investment in  disadvantaged
communities, and a world of genuine opportunity for all children.
IV.  THE PROMISE  OF REASSEMBLY
History has a way of making ideas more  complicated than they may seem in
the abstract.  For people  use, fear, and resist ideas; ideas become banners attached
to groups and institutions.  Sometimes, hopes get trampled in the process.  I have
suggested  that  the  political  dynamics  of  the  1940s  and  1950s  pushed  for
disaggregating the vision of an equal and free people  into separate  civil,  political,
economic,  and  social  dimensions.  School  reforms  demanded  by  courts  fell  far
short of the  vision of equal opportunity for  every  child  in America  regardless  of
race,  class, or geographic  location.  Recent  efforts  under state constitutions  have
93.  See Robert  M. Jensen, Advancing Education through Education Clauses of State Constitutions,
1997  BYU Educ. & L.J.  1, 9-26.  Maryland  settled a  similar case.  See Timothy Ayers, Student  Author,
Adequacy in Baltimore City Schools: Why the Consent Decree in Bradford v. Maryland Is Right, 5  Geo.
J. on Fighting Pov. 77,  78 (1997).  A Vermont  challenge that emphasized  finance generated features in
line  with  the adequacy  theory.  See Michael  A.  Rebell  &  Jeffrey  Metzler, Rapid Response, Radical
Reform: The Story of School Finance Litigation in Vermont, 31  J.L. &  Educ. 167,  171-79  (2002).  An
unsuccessful  suit  in  Oklahoma  nonetheless  contributed  to  the  passage  of  a  school  finance  reform
consonant  with the  adequacy  theory.  See Mark  S.  Grossman,  Oklahoma School Finance Litigation:
Shifting from Equity to Adequacy, 28 U.  Mich. J.L. Reform 521,  527-33 (1995).  Litigation  in Texas led
the state supreme  court  to repeatedly  strike  down  the school  finance  structure  without  developing  a
comprehensive  or  stable  plan  for  school  reform.  See  Margaret  Rose  Westbrook,  Student  Author,
School Finance Litigation Comes to North Carolina,  73 N.C. L.  Rev. 2123,  2129, 2133,  2182-83  (1995).
The  court  first  struck  down  the  state  finance  scheme  in  Edgewood Independent School District v.
Kirby, 777  S.W.2d 391  (Tex.  1989).  Subsequent decisions  addressing revised legislation include:  Meno
v.  Edgewood Independent School District, 917  S.W.2d  717  (Tex.  1995);  Carrollton-Farmers  Branch
Independent School District v. Edgewood Independent School District,  826 S.W.2d  489 (Tex.  1992); and
Edgewood Independent School District v.  Kirby, 804  S.W.2d  491  (Tex.  1991).  Similar  litigation  in
North  Carolina produced a demand for adequacy but raised new questions  about efficacy and cost.  See
Michael  Heise,  The  Courts, Educational Policy, and Unintended Consequences, 11 Cornell  J.L. &  Pub.
Policy  633,  658 (2002).  On  Washington and  West  Virginia, see generally  William S.  Koski, Of Fuzzy
Standards and Institutional  Constraints:  A  Re-Examination of the Jurisprudential  History of Educational
Finance  Reform Litigation, 43 Santa Clara L. Rev. 1185, 1245-52 (2003).
94.  Nickerson & Deenihan, supra n. 77,  1350-55.
95.  See  generally George  D.  Brown,  Binding Advisory Opinions: A  Federal Courts Perspective on
the State School Finance  Decisions, 35 B.C. L. Rev. 543 (1994);  Westbrook, supra n.  93, at 2184-85.
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allowed  advocates  and  parents  to reintegrate  these  strands  into  that  big vision.
Actual results remain to be seen.
Two  temptations  arise  on this  fiftieth  anniversary  of  the  Supreme  Court's
declaration that separate  schools are inherently unequal: to celebrate  the symbolic
victory  and  obscure  the shockingly  vast distance  that remains  from the vision  of
equal  opportunity  for  all  children-or  to  despair  at  the  missed  chances  and
obstacles.  I urge a different and better path inspired by the work, and indeed, the
words, of Frank Michelman, who once wrote: "Though it might turn out that there
is no way, in this vale of tears, to make things on the whole any better, you would
be committed to at least searching for some corrective."9 6
96.  Michelman, supra n. 1, at 33-34.
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